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Abstract
Background: In January 1998, the California state legislature extended a workplace smoking ban
to bars. The purpose of this study was to explore the conditions that facilitate or hinder compliance
with a smoking ban in bars.
Methods: We studied the implementation of the smoking ban in bars by interviewing three sets
of policy participants: bar employers responsible for complying with the law; local government
officials responsible for enforcing the law; and tobacco control activists who facilitated
implementation. We transcribed the interviews and did a qualitative analysis of the text.
Results:  The conditions that facilitated bar owners' compliance with a smoking ban in bars
included: if the cost to comply was minimal; if the bars with which they were in competition were
in compliance with the smoking ban; and if there was authoritative, consistent, coordinated, and
uniform enforcement. Conversely, the conditions that hindered compliance included: if the law had
minimal sanctions; if competing bars in the area allowed smoking; and if enforcement was delayed
or inadequate.
Conclusion:  Many local enforcers wished to forfeit their local discretion and believed the
workplace smoking ban in bars would be best implemented by a state agency. The potential
implication of this study is that, given the complex nature of local politics, smoking bans in bars are
best implemented at a broader provincial or national level.
Background
In the last decade, enacting workplace smoking bans in
bars has become common. While the state of California
was the first to prohibit smoking in bars in 1998, subse-
quently 16 nations (Bermuda, Bhutan, British Virgin
Islands, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Czech Republic,
England, France, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Northern
Ireland, Norway, Scotland, Sweden, Uruguay, and Wales),
six of the eight Australian states and territories, 12 of the
13 Canadian provinces and territories,[1] and 19 of 50
United States of America states have outlawed smoking in
bars. [2]
While passing legislation takes a great deal of activist coor-
dination and political consensus building, the law actu-
ally has to be implemented if workers are to benefit from
it. We present findings from our case study of the imple-
mentation of the smoking ban in bars in the state of Cali-
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fornia, from the initial presumed voluntary compliance
with the law, through the later stages of enforcement of
the law. We studied the policy process as it evolved, with
the goal of elucidating the conditions that facilitate com-
pliance with the smoking ban in bars, and the potential
barriers that hinder compliance. Our analysis follows the
trajectory of recent examinations of policy that conceptu-
alize implementation as the "process of change that
occurs after the adoption of a policy and before the routi-
nization of operations, activities, or tasks that are gov-
erned by the policy."[3] California Labor Code 6404.5
states that, "No employer shall knowingly or intentionally
permit, and no other person shall engage in, the smoking
of tobacco products in an enclosed space at a place of
employment" (Additional file 1). If there is smoking in a
workplace, employees or members of the public may con-
fidentially report violations to local law enforcement
agencies. In terms of penalties, there is a series of fines:
first violation $100; second violation (within one year)
$200; third and subsequent violations (within one year)
$500. The law also allows for the State of California Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (Cal OSHA) to
become involved, and the state can levy up to $70,000 in
fines. There is also the possibility of violators to be subject
to unfair business practice lawsuits from their competitors
who comply with the law.
When this law took effect in 1995, it required that all
workplaces except bars be smoke free. Most employers
voluntarily complied, but in 1998 when the smoking ban
was extended to bars, generally stand-alone bars did not
comply immediately or voluntarily. [4-7] Thus, the exten-
sion of the smoking ban to bars is a case example of an
implementation process that required both start up and
fine-tuning.
Assemblyman Terry Friedman introduced smoke-free
workplace legislation in the California State Assembly in
December 1992. According to Friedman's commentary at
various legislative committee meetings, his major impetus
was the issue of workers' compensation. [8,9] The legisla-
tion was introduced following a California workers' com-
pensation insurance fund award of $85,000 to a
restaurant waiter/manager who had suffered a heart
attack, [10] having no risk factors other than exposure to
tobacco smoke in the restaurant. The plaintiff's case
invoked the 1986 US Surgeon General's Report delineating
the health consequences of involuntary smoking for
healthy nonsmokers,[11] which included cancer and
heart disease. After this 1990 court case, but before the leg-
islation was passed in 1994, there were two additional sci-
entific reports on the hazards of exposure to tobacco
smoke that could also be used by workers in lawsuits
against employers who failed to provide a safe smoke-free
workplace: the 1991 National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health reaffirmed the health consequences of
passive smoking and recommended that non-smoking
workers be protected from involuntary workplace expo-
sure to tobacco smoke;[12] and the 1992 federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency established that tobacco smoke
was a Group A (known human) carcinogen[13] with no
safe exposure levels.
Any effort to reduce public exposure to tobacco smoke
typically draws the support of public health activists.
While the legislation was being considered, it was referred
to as Assembly Bill 13 or AB13. During the legislature's
debate of Assembly Bill 13, public health activists lobbied
for local control and enforcement. [8,9,14] At the time of
the debate, many municipalities in California had strong
smoke free ordinances. Activists wanted to assure that a
statewide law would not pre-empt stronger local ordi-
nances or regulations, and believed that local control
would assure the maintenance of local norms.
During a 1994 Judiciary Committee hearing, Friedman
stated his intentions to have the enforcement of the law
handled at the local level rather than at the state level:
We leave it to local government to decide how it
should be enforced. It's entirely within the control and
the flexibility and discretion of local government to
decide how to enforce it. I don't think that this is the
time to impose a mandate, to impose those costs on
local government and to force them to set up a
bureaucracy. [15]
The legislation that passed simply stated that local elected
officials were to designate a local government entity as
enforcer. On one hand, this vague enforcement provision
could be seen as the inevitable outcome of the legislature
grappling with a politically fraught issue. As Brodkin has
observed,
Ambiguous policy is produced when politicians seek
to avoid thorny political issues and, effectively, "pass
the buck" to the bureaucracy. This strategy (whether
consciously intended or not) enables politicians to
claim credit for grand policy objectives while reserving
the opportunity to blame the bureaucracy later for
political interpretations that generate political heat.
[16]
The legislation was ambiguous because it did not specify
who was to serve in what implementation role, primarily
because local governments do not typically have local
labor law enforcement apparatus. Policy analysts working
from a top down perspective[17] would predict that
because this law involved many and varied organizationsBMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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to implement it, implementation would be uncertain and
difficult.
On the other hand, as Ingram and Schneider have
observed,
From a grass roots perspective, vague and nonspecific
statutes may actually be virtues, not just because clar-
ity is impossible to achieve, but also because ambigu-
ity provides maximum leeway to local level
implementers permitting them to adapt the statute to
local needs. [18]
Policy analysts refer to the above-mentioned "maximum
leeway" as local enforcer discretion. Policy analysts work-
ing from a bottom up perspective[19] would predict that
the greater the complexity anticipated in the varied work-
places, especially numerous small, independently owned
workplaces such as bars, the greater the discretion that
enforcement officials would need to implement the policy.
We studied this particular implementation effort by track-
ing the actors involved, their decisions, and the conse-
quences of such. This state law prohibiting smoking in
workplaces can be characterized as a top-down initiative
with local groups and individuals charged with its imple-
mentation. We followed Brodkin's[16] suggestion that
implementation be analyzed as policy process, and inves-
tigated why, when, and how this policy was defined and
redefined in the field.
Methods
We collected interview data from three groups: bar
employers, local enforcement officials, and activists who
supported implementation. We conducted the interviews
from mid-1998 to 2000. We anticipated that our response
rate could be affected by bar owners' reluctance to put
themselves in a situation where they would admit break-
ing the law, and local enforcers reluctance to put them-
selves in a situation where they would admit failing to
enforce a law, therefore we secured a Certificate of Confi-
dentiality issued by the National Institutes of Health to
protect participants in this research study from any breach
of confidentiality. Upon inviting each subject to partici-
pate in this research study, we informed them that the
confidentiality of any information they would give us was
protected legally by the Certificate of Confidentiality and
ethically by the University of California-San Francisco
Committee on Human Research (H2758-14852-03).
Bar Employers
We sampled bar employers (owners) from the entire state,
defining our population as all California bars, taverns,
and gaming clubs (henceforth referred to as "bars"). The
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
(ABC) issues liquor licenses to all bars, and we included
in our sample the types of licenses that are issued to
"stand alone" bars, that is, bars that do not serve meals:
Type 42: On-sale beer and wine public premises (N =
1,333)
Type 48: On-sale general public premises (N = 3,503)
Type 61: On-sale beer public premises (N = 36)
This set of licenses resulted in a population of 4872 bars.
We stratified the sample by county (N = 57; 58 California
counties minus one county with no stand-alone bars) and
randomly sampled 5% of liquor licenses from each
county. We used random sampling to reduce selection
bias. We sent letters to the bar owners listed on the license
to the address of the bar, and a follow-up letter one month
later. In the letter we requested a confidential interview
with the bar employer about their experiences with the
smoking ban in bars, either in-person or by phone. We
sent out 231 letters requesting an interview, and 57 bar
owners responded. Of those that responded, 28 agreed to
be interviewed, 20 refused to be interviewed, and nine bar
owners told us that they had sold their business.
In order to assure that the bar owners who agreed to be
interviewed were not operating bars that were different
from those that refused to be interviewed or did not
respond, we compared three groups (those who agreed to
be interviewed, those who refused to be interviewed, and
those who did not respond at all) on four economic cen-
sus data indicators[20] that were based on the geographic
area of the bar's postal code:
1) The number of bars in their postal zone – to assure that
our respondents were not coming from areas where they
had either more or less competition.
2) The median sales receipts of bars in their postal zone –
to assure that our respondents were not coming from an
area where the businesses were either more or less pros-
perous.
3) The median annual payroll of bars in their postal zone
– to assure that our respondents were not coming from an
area where employees earned either more or less.
4) The median number of paid employees in their postal
zone – to assure that our respondents were not coming
from a geographical area that had either more or fewer
paid employees.
Table 1 lists summary economic indicators for the three
groups of bar owner respondents.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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The results of the Kruskal Wallis test indicated that there
was a statistically significant difference (p = 0.045)
between the bar owners who refused to be interviewed
and the other two groups in that the bar owners who
refused to be interviewed operated bars in postal zones in
which the median sales receipts were lower.
Of the bar owners who agreed to be in the study, we were
able to contact and interview 28 either by phone or at
their bar. The in-depth semi-structured interviews of bar
owners were guided by the interview schedule in Addi-
tional file 2.
Local Enforcement Officials
Our goal was to interview at least one enforcement official
from each of the 57 California counties that had stand-
alone bars. Soon after we began this study, a state-funded
organization compiled and published a list of designated
enforcement personnel by county. [21] We sent a letter of
invitation to two randomly selected enforcement officials
from each of the 57 California counties that had free-
standing bars, and a month later sent a follow-up. In the
letter we asked the enforcer for a confidential interview,
either in-person or by telephone, about their experiences
with the smoking ban in bars. Forty-five local enforce-
ment officials responded: 30 agreed to be interviewed,
and 15 declined to be interviewed.
In order to assure that the local enforcement officials who
agreed to be interviewed were not working in counties
that were different from those that refused to be inter-
viewed or did not respond, we compared three groups
(those who agreed to be interviewed, those who refused to
be interviewed, and those who did not respond at all) on
four economic census data indicators[20] that were based
on the geographic area of the county:
1) The number of bars in their county – to assure that our
respondents were not coming from areas where they had
either more or less bars to monitor.
2) The median sales receipts of bars in their county – to
assure that our respondents were not coming from a
county where the businesses were either more or less pros-
perous.
3) The median annual payroll of bars in their county – to
assure that our respondents were not coming from a
county where employees earned either more or less.
4) The median number of paid employees in their county
– to assure that our respondents were not coming from a
county that had either more or fewer paid employees.
Table 2 is a summary of economic indicators for each of
the three groups of law enforcement respondents.
The results of the Kruskal Wallis test indicated that there
were no statistically significant differences (p > 0.35) in
the economic indicators of the counties of the local
enforcement officials who agreed to be interviewed, those
who refused to be interviewed, and those who did not
respond. Of those who agreed to be in the study, we were
able to contact and interview all 30. The in-depth semi-
structured interviews of local enforcement officials were
guided by the interview schedule in Additional file 3.
Activists
We intended to interview both activists who worked for or
against the implementation of California Labor Code
6404.5. We identified activists by doing a NEXIS® online
search of newspapers, magazines, and broadcast tran-
scripts dated December 7, 1992 to January 19, 1999 using
the terms: "California" and "Assembly Bill 13" or "AB13"
or "AB 13." Our search produced 138 news articles, 37
magazine articles, and transcripts from four broadcasts.
We reviewed these news accounts, and recorded the name
and affiliation of any activist, supporting or opposing the
workplace smoking ban, who was mentioned in the news
source. We were able to find addresses of 46 activists who
had supported Assembly Bill 13, and 11 activists against
Assembly Bill 13. We sent each a letter that explained how
we knew of their activism (full citations of news sources
were given), and requested an interview, either in-person
or by telephone, about their advocacy for or against the
smoking ban in bars. We sent a follow-up letter a month
later. Of the 46 activists who supported the smoking ban
in bars, 12 agreed to be interviewed, two declined to be
interviewed, and 32 did not respond. Of the 11 activists
against Assembly Bill 13, two declined to be interviewed,
and nine did not respond. Therefore, we interviewed only
Table 1: Economic indicators of bars in sample
Bar owner response 
group
Average number of bars 
in postal zipcode
Median sales or receipts Median annual payroll Median number of paid 
employees
Agreed to be interviewed
(N = 28)
67 25,000,000 to 49,999,000 5,000,000 to 9,999,000 500 to 999
Refused to be interviewed
(N = 20)
68 10,000,000 to 24,999,000 5,000,000 to 9,999,000 500 to 999
Did not respond 62 25,000,000 to 49,999,000 5,000,000 to 9,999,000 500 to 999BMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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activists who were in favor of Assembly Bill 13 (N = 12)
guided by the interview schedule in Additional file 4.
Data Analysis
Interviews lasted an hour to an hour and a half, and inter-
views were audio taped (18 bar owners, 19 local enforcers,
and 12 activists) unless the respondent would not allow
recording, in which case we asked for permission to take
handwritten notes (10 bar owners, 11 local enforcers).
The audiotapes were transcribed verbatim and we analyzed
the transcripts using grounded theory procedures. [22-25]
When doing open coding, we labelled the ideas contained
in passages of text. For example, when coding a transcript
of an interview of a bar owner some concepts that were
identified included "wanting to comply," "finding loop-
holes," "feigning compliance," and so forth. We grouped
these concepts into a larger category of "compliance." Cer-
tain characteristics or properties, such as "degree of com-
pliance" or "modifying compliance" described the
category "compliance." Dimensions for the properties of
"compliance" ranged from "complete compliance" to
"non-compliance."
Then we integrated data and codes across transcripts and
respondents, and from the data generated hypothesized
relationships to explain and clarify categories. Continuing
the example above, we tracked a relationship between
"non-compliance" and the perception of an "uneven play-
ing field." Therefore, we were able to link categories,
hypothesize relationships, and re-examine the data to ver-
ify our analysis.
Finally, we followed concepts and categories in light of
changing situations or circumstances. Continuing with
the example of "compliance," we considered how
respondents altered strategies over time in response to
changing situations. For example, we tracked alterations
along the dimension of "non-compliance" to "compli-
ance" as bar owners responded to changing conditions of
a "level playing field" or the initiation of "enforcement."
Results
We begin by presenting the issues central to the bar own-
ers because in January 1998, when few enforcement
mechanisms were being put into place, the onus was on
the bar owners to comply voluntarily. Given that the
enforcement effort came later, we next present issues
regarding enforcement. Finally, we close with findings
from the interviews of tobacco control activists, who
responded to events as they unfolded.
Bar Employers
In general, bar employers feared that their compliance
with the workplace safety law would threaten their sales
revenues. Therefore, they complied with the law to the
degree they believed they could afford to. When inter-
viewed, bar employers reported that they were in compli-
ance if they had made any effort to comply. However,
when asked to elaborate, we learned that compliance was
an elastic concept, and heard them describe a gradation
ranging from non-compliance through various degrees of
compliance.
A bar owner was likely to be in compliance if the costs of
compliance were minimal, for example, if the bar had an
existing accessible, safe, and comfortable (usually con-
cerning weather) area where patrons could smoke out-
doors. This bar owner explains the ease of complying
given that the bar was located in a temperate coastal
region and already had an outdoor patio:
We have two separate bars, and then we have one very
large outdoor patio space. Just about anybody that
had the patio spaces – I think those bars actually
picked up a little bit of business because people could
smoke outside. I have friends that don't smoke – those
people would consciously not go to a bar where they
knew there was going to be a lot of smoking. We prob-
ably had a return of those people.
Most bar owners believed that the smoking ban would
reduce profit, so they were caught between wanting to
abide by the law, yet fearing the consequences of full com-
pliance. They engaged in modified compliance, comply-
ing when the consequences were negligible, by allowing
smoking at some times (e.g., after 5 p.m.), on some days
(e.g., during special events), or in some areas, as does this
bar owner:
Table 2: Economic indicators of counties of law enforcers in sample
Local enforcer 
response group
Average number of 
bars in county
Mean county sales or 
receipts
Mean county average 
payroll
Mean county number of 
employees
Agreed to be interviewed
(N = 30)
742 383,193,000 105,156,000 10,865
Refused to be interviewed
(N = 15)
1,120 649,998,000 176,856,000 18,462
Did not respond
(N = 12)
1,327 770,775,000 205,007,000 20,387BMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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We've quite a big bar, so what we've done is we've
allowed it in the poolroom only, nowhere near the
food.
Later in the interview, this particular bar owner explained
that the bar had a ventilation hood over the range, and
continued, "So, I've explained to them, 'Girls, you're in no
danger. Look how much this hood takes away.' You know,
I mean I'm not putting them in danger. They agreed to
take the job back when every bar was allowing smoking."
Many of the bar owners were unaware of the scientific
research available at the time regarding the inability of
ventilation to remove environmental tobacco smoke. [26-
28]
Other bar owners looked for loopholes in the law. For
example, this bar owner understood that the law was an
employee protection measure and deduced that if they
had no employees the law would not apply to them:
Two ex-employees and I started the bar in (city): the
three of us went down there and opened this place,
and the three of us worked it. So, when the law came
into effect we did not have to abide by it, we had an
exemption because we had no employees.
From a business standpoint, the sanctions to penalize
non-compliance were minimal. Yet, some bar owners
complied because they feared that the attention generated
by a smoking violation could lead enforcement authori-
ties to notice other, far more consequential, violations.
This was usually the case if the bar owner was under sur-
veillance because of prior violations that threatened their
liquor license, for example, underage drinking, exceeding
maximum capacity, or drug trafficking. In these cases the
bar owner generalized compliance to all legislation or reg-
ulations, including the smoking ban. An owner of both a
bar and an adult club explained the decision to comply
with the smoking ban:
Primarily with the adult clubs, I am very tightly moni-
tored by the police, in the extreme. And, it just doesn't
make sense for me to allow anything that's illegal
because the police will use that as a means to harass
me. So, I've been very strict about enforcing the no
smoking policies.
We found that bar owners were very concerned with issues
of equity: that all businesses in their area were subject to
the same enforcement. If other bars in their area were
complying, then the bar under study was likely to be in
compliance. If other bars in the area allowed smoking, bar
owners feared losing their customers, and therefore were
less likely to be in compliance. If other bars in the area
allowed smoking, even if the bar owner wanted to com-
ply, the probability of sustaining initial compliance was
low, as can be heard in this interview:
The law was blatantly ignored by most – I'd say 90%
of the bars. There's a bar two doors down from me that
has always been kind of a hip dive and all my smokers
went there. I would come down on a Friday night and
I would have twelve people, and the bar next door was
packed. That went on for a long time with me contact-
ing the police and saying, "What's going on? There's a
law going on here! I mean I understand civil disobedi-
ence, if someone wants to break the law, they should
be able to break it. But shouldn't they be the ones that
are being penalized economically, not someone who's
obeying the law?" After a few months of, I mean, seri-
ous, serious, economic disadvantage, my employees
were just ready to quit or take jobs at other bars, peo-
ple that had worked for me for five or six years. I did a
compromise where I allowed people to smoke after 10
o'clock at their own risk. I wasn't in a position to be
able to enforce that law and to march boldly toward
economic ruin.
As per this owner, over time, without adequate enforce-
ment, even bar owners who had initially complied with
the law retreated from compliance because they feared the
financial consequences of operating a business on an une-
ven playing field.
We were not able to determine whether bar employers
understood or believed the seriousness of the health con-
sequences of exposure to tobacco smoke. However, com-
plying with a workplace smoking ban was a particularly
onerous task given that bar owners/employers were struc-
turally compromised: the business has to attract custom-
ers to make a profit; and those very customers were
producing the toxin unconnected to the service delivered.
If an employer has to protect workers from exposure to
asbestos or radon, they can have the substance removed
from the workplace, or they can move the workplace to a
toxic free location. If an employer has to protect workers
from exposure to by-products of a manufacturing process,
such as arsenic or benzene, they can change the produc-
tion process or they can find safer substitutes. While an
employer has control over where the business is located,
how employees work, and how manufacturing is con-
ducted, protecting workers from tobacco smoke was dif-
ferent in that those in the service industry have little
control over customers' behavior, and in fact, controlling
customers is often counter-productive to the goals of mak-
ing a profit. The bar owners understood that compliance
with this particular code involved the cooperation of their
customers, as this bar owner explains:BMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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The health department – they are a routine investiga-
tive agency, and they come in periodically and go
around and check everything they are supposed to. If
there are any violations, we correct them; it is just a
normal process. Smoking has become a thing that the
customers get involved with; and then, you know, they
become belligerent.
Ultimately, the bar employers' lack of compliance with
the law can be attributed to their reluctance to ask custom-
ers to stop smoking: they were unwilling to engage in
efforts to change their customers' behavior in order to
make their employees' workplace safer. Their compro-
mised situation made outside enforcement efforts more
important.
Enforcement
The law specified that local elected officials were to dele-
gate the enforcement of Labor Code 6404.5 to a local gov-
ernment entity. Because there had been widespread
voluntary compliance to Labor Code 6404.5 before its
extension to bars in 1998, local officials had little enforce-
ment experience, as this county health worker explained:
Mainly what we found before bars enforcement was
that letters, phone calls, and an occasional site visit
took care of the problem. With the bars, nothing could
have been further from the truth. We found that we
needed to go out to the law enforcement agents in
these targeted areas where we were having problems
and ask them if they would be willing to actively
enforce these laws and partner with us to make sure
there was a uniform application of them.
The local government entity's enforcement experience var-
ied. When dealing with tobacco, health department offi-
cials tended to have more experience with health
education campaigns. A city health department director
explained, "Typically we don't enforce, we don't protect
workers. We protect the public." On the other hand, a
police chief was much more comfortable with enforce-
ment:
You have a person committing a crime, whether it be
selling heroin or smoking a cigarette. When it comes
down to the nuts and bolts of how do you get the per-
son not to do it, not commit the crime anymore, it's
basic law enforcement.
We consistently heard about how long it took localities to
begin enforcing, as this enforcer relayed:
I guess there had been some previous meetings, but it
has been about two years now, and we in (county)
have taken minimal enforcement action. So, they were
kind of saying, "OK, look, the warning period is over.
We are gonna get serious about it." So, we had the big
meeting, and then we developed a game plan in our
city.
In some areas, enforcement was delayed as the "hot
potato" of enforcement responsibility was passed from
one local agency to another. In response to a question
about the pros and cons of situating enforcement at the
local level, this building code inspector replied:
I think that it was a definite disadvantage. It made it
almost twice as hard, probably because one little
agency thought they could push it off on the other
agency. The local police department said, "It's the
health department's job." The health department said,
"It is the fire department's job." It just went around in
a big circle. It was almost two years before we just
finally said that's enough; this is what's gonna happen.
The bar owners were aware that the responsibility for
enforcement was passing from entity to entity, as this
respondent relayed:
TM: Are you saying that right now the city building code
inspectors are responsible for enforcing the law?
Bar Owner: Right.
TM: Do you know why?
Bar Owner: Probably because the health department
was too busy. Everybody seems to be putting it off on
everybody else, it's like nobody wants to deal with it. I
mean, you know, these enforcement people don't
really want to do it.
Berman reminds us that policy is "implemented by pro-
gram operators who may or may not be in sympathy with
the plans, may or may not have even understood them,
but in any case will certainly be governed by their own
motives and imperatives, both personal and program-
matic."[17] Among various political entities in a given
locale, different actors held different views on the impor-
tance of enforcing smoking restrictions. For example,
often health department officers would cite bar employers
only to find their work undone when the district attorneys
failed to press charges, or the regional judge dismissed the
charges. Bar owners noticed the lack of consistency, as
indicated in this account:
I went to court and the district attorney said, "Well,
let's go outside and talk." He said, "I smoke. I think it's
a bad law too, but I have to enforce it. What they're try-
ing to do is fine you $300 for the offense and be onBMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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probation one more time." So I said, "Well, we'll talk
to the judge." And he said, "I'm going to recommend
a $50 fine, and next time anybody's caught it will be a
$200 fine." So I said, "Well, OK. That's better than
$300."
This lack of coordination with, and support from, other
enforcement entities was a central concern for frontline
enforcers. One enforcer captured the essence of the issue:
"And, the nice thing is that when I catch the bartender
smoking, I can write them up for a Health and Safety Code
violation, which is much easier to make stick."
Jacobson and Wasserman contend that most states that
pass clean indoor air laws delegate enforcement responsi-
bility to local agencies without designating additional
funding. [29] California Labor Code 6404.5 was one such
"unfunded mandate." Not having funds meant that
locales were not able to designate personnel nor reassign
staff time to implement and enforce, even in places where
local government administrators were in favor of the
smoking ban in bars. Local governments were further con-
strained by prohibitions against using tobacco tax reve-
nues for anything but prevention and education.
Consequently, tobacco control staff, those who had tech-
nical expertise in tobacco issues, were prohibited from
engaging in enforcement because they received tobacco
tax funds. Even when locales made a good faith effort to
enforce, having to work within their funding parameters
meant that they could only assign limited personnel to
enforcement, and/or had to limit enforcement to regular
working hours (9-to-5). Working within these confines
demanded Herculean exertion, as described by this
enforcer:
We have one person, me, working on 1,400 bars...The
fear of citation has to be a little bit more than what it
is now because I think they've figured out the num-
bers: in that you have one guy and 1,400 bars in the
county, and he can't be in two communities at the
same time. So, I think that people are banking on the
fact that they are going to get away with it. It's like, if
there was only one highway patrol for the whole
county, what would the speeding be like? It would be
out of control.
The most expensive enforcement activities were those in
which two workers were needed. Sometimes this was
because health department workers were physically
threatened while inspecting bars, as this enforcer
describes:
The police departments have been very helpful to
accompany me in places that are kind of ugly. In fact,
it's gotten to the point now where, with just about all
of them, we have to have escort...I had somebody mail
me a bullet the other day in an anonymous note...I
had one guy say after I cited him when I was leaving,
"Well, I just hope nothing happens to your car when
you drive home," and made some vague sinister refer-
ence to my family.
Tobacco control enforcers having to take precautions to
protect themselves from harm has also been reported by
DiFranza et al. [30] who used "sting" operations in Massa-
chusetts to deter merchants from selling tobacco to
minors; and by Ashley et al. [31] who enforced smoking
bans in Ontario high schools. While escorts are prudent
given the strong feelings elicited by the smoking bans in
bars, the coupling of workers cuts the workforce's produc-
tivity in half while doubling the salary liability.
Many of the enforcers we interviewed currently, or previ-
ously had, enforced other codes, for example, the health
department's enforcement of no smoking when handling
food or drink, the building code department's enforce-
ment of the standards of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the fire department's enforcement of maximum occu-
pancy standards, and the police department's enforce-
ment of public drunkenness prohibitions. Therefore, the
enforcement of the workplace smoking ban was folded
into an ongoing relationship between bar owner and
enforcer. When asked to compare the enforcement of the
smoking ban in bars to other codes they enforced, local
enforcers unanimously contended that enforcing the
smoking ban in bars was more difficult because customers
were causing the workplace safety hazard, as opposed to
employers or employees.
Following a series of court cases in which bar owners chal-
lenged the enforcement of law, the local enforcers lost
ground. This enforcer explained:
In our community, the district attorney would not
allow us to cite the owner initially. We are required to
cite the patrons to establish a pattern of non-compli-
ance. Our district attorney, although I said has been
very supportive over the years, read the law and said he
felt he couldn't bring a case before a judge unless we
had a couple of citations of patrons on different days
that showed that there was more than a chance occur-
rence there was smoking taking place in the establish-
ment.
Having the police cite patrons is a step toward the goal of
the law in that it reduces the exposure of workers to
tobacco smoke, and hence should reduce workers' com-
pensation cases. However, police ticketing patrons does
not necessarily meet the intent of the law, which specified
that local elected officials should designate local enforcersBMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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who would assure that employers provided safe work-
places for their employees. When local officials cite
employers for failing to provide a smoke-free work envi-
ronment, it forces bar owners' involvement. The strategy
of the police citing customers changes both who does the
enforcement (police instead of designated local officials)
and who must act to be in compliance (customers instead
of employers), effectively letting the bar owners "off the
hook." From the perspective of top down policy analysis,
the policy of ticketing patrons could be viewed as a slip-
ping away from the intended target of the labor law –
employers. From the bottom up perspective, police ticket-
ing patrons could be viewed as using local discretion to
develop an innovative response to a problematic situa-
tion. The shift from focusing on employer compliance to
the police ticketing patrons could be conceptualized as an
adaptation to the difficult circumstances of not having
enough local resources to provide the level of enforce-
ment that was needed.
As did the enforcer quoted earlier, many enforcers often
compared the workplace smoking ban in bars to speeding:
that people in general speeded, and that the only way to
deter speeding was to have 24/7 potential of substantial
sanctions. The types of local government agency person-
nel assigned to enforcement usually worked 9-to-5 Mon-
day to Friday, while the police worked around the clock.
Enforcers knew that a prosperous bar owner could absorb
increasing fines of $100/$200/$500 as the cost of doing
business. However, an individual customer would be
more strongly impacted by a series of personal citations.
From the local enforcers' perspective, they were losing
ground. They made comparisons with other enforcement
efforts that worked. They contended that enforcement
would be more effective if it was handled at the state,
rather than local, level of government, as per this enforcer:
If this was an enforceable citation by Cal OSHA, it
could have been done in a month. People in bars and
restaurants and any kind of industry, they shake in
their boots when they get a Cal OSHA violation
because the fines are so large and they have to go all
the way to Sacramento for their hearings – it just
makes it impossible for them.
The enforcers knew that there was one sanction that was
extremely important to bar owners, that was their liquor
license. Therefore, almost all enforcers interviewed saw
the prohibition of smoking as a factor that should be eval-
uated by the state Department of Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol (ABC) when considering whether to renew or revoke
a bar liquor license. A local police chief who was actively
enforcing the law in a rural community explained:
As I said, to enforce this effectively it has to be taken
out of the locals' hands. It has to be like ABC, it has to
be a state effort. It has to be enforced at the state level
because, especially in small communities the issue is
too politically charged; and when you're talking about
chiefs of police that are at-will employees, it's not
something that is worth risking my job for.
In one sense, the enforcers utilized their local discretion to
search for pragmatic solutions to the implementation
problem, while simultaneously concluding that the law
would be better implemented if they had less local discre-
tion. The state legislators had passed control to the locals,
and the locals seemed to want to pass it back.
Activists
Activists worked to generate and maintain a willingness to
intervene and repair any breakdowns in the implementa-
tion process. As mentioned above, the enforcers inter-
viewed reported that enforcement was delayed, and that
many locales did nothing. Activists had a role in catalyz-
ing enforcement. For example, one city did not enforce
until it was forced to, as explained by this activist:
We worked very closely with the city attorney and
actually got very involved with her office. There was
talk of filing a writ of mandamus, and that's a very
embarrassing issue for the city. Basically, we'd go into
the court and say, "There's a law on the books, the city
is refusing to enforce it, and we're filing a writ of man-
damus." Now I'm not saying that we were threatening
to do that ((laughter)), but let's just say that a writ of
mandamus was discussed with the city attorney. And
the city attorney, I think, looked at the situation and
said, "That is a significant possibility that that could
happen." I think that she was concerned it could pos-
sibly be successful, at that point contacted the mayor
and chief of police, and was able to convince them
that this was a significant problem of them refusing to
enforce current California law. Then the mayor and
chief of police put out a joint letter to all the bars and
bar-restaurant combos within the city lines and started
to enforce it.
The local enforcers relayed many instances when their
work in bars was undermined by a lack of coordination
between the various local agencies that were linked in the
chain of local enforcement. Activists in non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) often had an overarching perspec-
tive from which they could see where the gaps in enforce-
ment were. Moreover, because activist organizations are
typically multileveled (local, national, and international),
staffers often were experienced in organizing, managing,
and coordinating large-scale efforts. For example, thisBMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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activist explained how their organization intervened to
enhance the smooth flow of enforcement in a locality:
In (city) we had a chief of police who was strongly in
support of this, but the assistant city attorney wasn't
too crazy about actually prosecuting. Therefore, cita-
tions were being written, but people really weren't
being prosecuted in terms that were effective. So we
met with what we felt was the weak link in the chain,
which was the city attorney's office. So, it depends, if
you have a champion in the area and the champion is
in a position of influence, then you go to that cham-
pion. If you don't have a specific champion that's in a
position of influence, then often times you have to go
to a weak link in the chain.
While NGOs were not in a position to make up for local
government budget shortfalls, they were able to compen-
sate by providing other resources, such as information.
Organizations that had prepared for the extension of the
smoking ban to bars were ready to supply bar owners with
technical assistance to foster their compliance, as
explained by this activist:
We have a response team of resource people. So, let's
say you were a bar owner and you were going to make
a patio outside, and you had never before used patio
heaters. We have a person who can answer every ques-
tion about patio heaters. So, what we try to do is to
cover every aspect that bar owners would need to
know to make their transition easier.
Furthermore, organizations gathered information on a
state-wide level and distributed it to local enforcers, espe-
cially legal information. For example, BREATH, a project
of the American Lung Association, compiled court deci-
sions, legislative counsel, and legal opinions; provided
sample warning letters and citations; and also identified
resource people who could provide advice and serve as
expert witnesses in local court cases. [32] Tobacco control
activist organizations also tracked court challenges, as this
respondent describes:
We stayed in touch through the county health depart-
ments with what was happening in the local courts.
And when cases would come through, we'd speak to
people who were involved and take note of what hap-
pened and then share that information with other
jurisdictions. So we gathered as much information as
we could about what was happening in the courts and
we gave it back to the local lead agencies and we did a
mailing to all the district attorneys around the state
giving them an update on the court cases, gathering
documents that had been written by other city attor-
neys and district attorneys if they tried to interpret the
law.
When the case law was initially being developed, BREATH
arranged a consensus conference of city attorneys to opine
on what was, and was not, potentially defensible in the
inevitable court challenges. All these efforts helped to fill
the void that the unfunded mandate had left, especially
for the local offices of the district attorneys.
Discussion
In sum, our respondents reported that the conditions that
facilitated bar owners' compliance with a smoking ban in
bars included: if the cost to comply was minimal; if the
bars with which they were in competition were in compli-
ance with the smoking ban; and if there was authoritative,
consistent, coordinated, and uniform enforcement. Con-
versely, the conditions that hindered compliance
included: if the law had minimal sanctions for non-com-
pliance; if competing bars in the area allowed smoking;
and if enforcement was delayed, inadequate, or
unfunded.
The lessons that could be drawn from this particular case
of policy implementation have to do with giving local dis-
cretion to local implementers when dealing with a multi-
tude of local businesses. Policy analysts who work from
the bottom up tradition favor local discretion because it is
a "flexible strategy that allows for adaptation to local dif-
ficulties and contextual factors."[33] However, in the case
of the workplace smoking ban in bars, no amount of flex-
ibility or adaptation was a match for the local difficulties
and contextual factors.
The first local difficulty was the issue of the "level playing
field." In order to protect their individual business inter-
ests, bar owners had to work collectively in unanimously
complying with or unanimously ignoring the law. The
slim profit margins at stake increased the focus on, and
the salience of, even and consistently maintained enforce-
ment so that no bar was at a competitive disadvantage. No
amount of local discretion was going to provide local
enforcers with a bigger stick or a better carrot to foster the
magnitude of change required.
The second local difficulty was the very "local-ness" of
enforcement. The local officials designated to enforce the
smoking ban in bars did not necessarily share the state leg-
islators' concerns regarding prophylactic measures needed
to thwart a potential state workers' compensation fund
catastrophe. Simply stated: the local enforcers were not
motivated by the basic philosophical principles of the
law. The enforcement responsibility was a new element in
a typically long and ongoing relationship between local
officials and local business people. The reality of local
businesses' resistance to change was something that the
state legislators did not have to face, and something that
the local enforcers had difficulty getting beyond.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:402 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/402
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A contextual problem was the lack of implementation
capacity. The state gave local enforcers the responsibility
of enforcing the law, and not much else. Some of the des-
ignated local enforcers had never enforced a law before;
some did not have the basic resources needed, such as
time or funds. No amount of local discretion can make up
for the local debits incurred by an unfunded mandate,
especially to enforce a resisted law.
During the legislative hearings, public health advocates
advanced the position that local discretion is good and
desirable, and ultimately the best option for policy imple-
mentation. [8,9,14] This case study challenges that gener-
alization in revealing an irony: the local people to whom
local discretion was given did not want it. When their
efforts to implement were thwarted, they utilized local
discretion to find a solution that they had local capacity to
effect: police began ticketing patrons who were smoking
in the bars. Police ticketing bar patrons may be an exam-
ple of using local discretion to find a new means to an
end, but eventually when other implementation efforts
failed, it became the end in and of itself.
Local officials who were designated as enforcers had enough
experience to distinguish between policies that could be
implemented locally versus policies that begged state imple-
mentation. The enforcers interviewed consistently proposed
that the state workplace smoking ban should be imple-
mented by the state workplace safety agency: the California
Occupational Safety and Health Agency. Short of that
option, experience taught them that the bar owners' most
valuable and vulnerable possession was their liquor license,
and including compliance with a smoking ban as a contin-
gency in a liquor license review, as well as including a threat
to a liquor license in the gradations of penalties for non-
compliance with the smoking ban, would give the enforcers
more leverage. However, liquor licenses were under the con-
trol of yet another state agency, the California Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control.
Conclusion
This case study advances the implementation knowledge
base in that it illuminates the dynamic of state mandates
and local discretion. The implementation of the smoking
ban in bars was difficult in California, yet despite the pub-
lic challenges, other cities e.g., Mexico City,[34] counties
e.g., Madison County, Kentucky,[2] states e.g., New Mex-
ico,[2] and nations e.g., Uruguay,[1] have adopted the
innovation of extending the workplace smoking ban to
bars. Therefore, there are important lessons to be learned
from this detailed empirical study of the "on the ground"
operationalization of this public health policy.
In the past, government mandates that meet with local
opposition, such as water fluoridation, could be imple-
mented with simple structural solutions, such as govern-
ment officials adding a substance to the water. The ease of
solving that type of implementation problem is in con-
trast to what is needed when dealing with many small
businesses that have little or no incentive to change.
Implementing a smoking ban in all workplaces – includ-
ing bars – requires having to designate an enforcement
entity, plan coordination between various involved agen-
cies, determine a consistent timeline for implementation,
and assure resources adequate for enforcement. Our find-
ings indicate that local implementation of a state law also
requires "buy in" of the street level bureaucrats who will
have to enforce it.
Furthermore, this study has implications for future
research on comparable policy implementation; the pol-
icy struggle regarding worker safety from repetitive stress
injury is a prescient example. Ergonomic regulations in
the states of Washington and California are examples of
top down policy that must be implemented in a myriad of
local settings. However, in both states, the Occupational
Safety and Health Agency formulated the regulation and
is responsible for enforcement, thereby avoiding some of
the problems inherent when one branch of government
develops the policy and another is expected to enforce it.
The implementation of the workplace-smoking ban in
bars demonstrates that when implementing workplace
health and safety policies in the context of multiple small
businesses, there are limits in the degree to which local
discretion can facilitate successful policy implementation.
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